Among several other product announcements, Thomson Reuters Legal recently disclosed that it will release in beta the first legal product using Watson’s cognitive computing technologies by year’s end. On Dewey B Strategic, Jean O’Grady writes

Ever since TR announced their collaboration with IBM Watson last October, the legal community has been impatient to learn how this alliance will manifest in a legal product. We still don’t know but TR did promise that they will be the first company for built a legal product using Watson technology. The alliance will combine IBM’s cognitive computing with TR’s deep domain expertise. A panel of executives from TR and Watson revealed that there will be a beta product available by the end of 2016. Their first collaboration will focus on taming the complexities of global financial regulation.

Bob Ambrogi adds “The product will help users untangle the sometimes-confusing web of global legal and regulatory requirements and will be targeted at customers in corporate legal, corporate compliance and law firms. Initially, it will focus on financial services, [Erik Laughlin, managing director, Legal Managed Services and Corporate Segment, and head of the Watson Initiative] suggested, but will also address other domains important to corporations.”

Very interesting. Wouldn’t it be something if TR was prepared to demonstrate how this product will work at AALL ALI AALL in Chicago this year? — Joe

The Legal History and Rare Books (LH&RB) Section of the American Association of Law Libraries (AALL), in cooperation with Cengage Learning, announces the Eighth Annual Morris L. Cohen Student Essay Competition. The competition is named in honor of Morris L. Cohen, late Professor Emeritus of Law at Yale Law School.

The competition is designed to encourage scholarship and to acquaint students with the AALL and law librarianship, and is open to students currently enrolled in accredited graduate programs in library science, law, history, and related fields. Essays may be on any topic related to legal history, rare law books, or legal archives. The winner will receive a $500.00 prize from Cengage Learning and up to $1,000 for expenses to attend the AALL Annual Meeting.

The entry form and instructions are available at the LH&RB website: http://www.aallnet.org/sections/lhrb/awards Entries must be submitted by 11:59 p.m.,April 18, 2016 (EST).

AALL via Mark.

I was helping a cite checker with Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes when I came across this free site called WestlawNext State Government Sites.  I’m not sure what TR is trying to do with this as FindLaw still exists.  The collection features a small but haphazard collection of primary and quasi-primary materials from what I would describe as all over the place.  The limited number of states represented are far from comprehensive.  The materials presented are just as puzzling.  Each collection has different ways to conduct searches.  Take a look.  Anybody with reactions please let me know.

Mark

Sarah Glassmeyer has released the results of a survey of state primary law. State Legal Information Census (PDF). Here’s the abstract:

This report presents findings from a survey of state level primary legal information.   Primary legal information includes code (codified statutes passed by state legislatures), regulations (codified collections of rules passed by administrative agencies) and case law (appellate court decisions).  This survey was done with the goal of reviewing the free and open status of this legal information.

Findings indicate that there exists at least 14 barriers to accessing legal information.  These barriers exist for both the individual user of a resource for personal research as well as a institutional user that would seek to republish or transform the information.   At the time of the census, no state provided barrier-free access to their legal information.

Furthermore, analysis of the legal information provided by states shows that it is impossible to do any but the most basic of legal research for free using state provided legal information sources.  Current collections allow for citation retrieval and some basic keyword searching.  No state allows for federated searching of legal information collections.   The universal lack of a citator for case law renders these collections, as a practical matter, useless and would be considered malpractice for a legal practitioner to rely upon.   There is also a worrisome lack of archival material maintained by states.  Not only does this affect one’s ability to do comprehensive research, but it also could be indicative of a lack of adequate preservation.

States were scored and ranked based on the openess of their legal publication practices.  On a scale of 0 – 24, the highest score achieved was 18.  The lowest was 8 and the median was 14.  These results were compared against the adoption of the Uniform Electronic Legal Information Act (UELMA) and it was found that adoption of UELMA did not correlate to barrier free publication practices.

— Joe

Yes, Judge Richard Posner has written another book, Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary (Harvard UP, Janurary 2016). Here’s the blurb:

Judges and legal scholars talk past one another, if they have any conversation at all. Academics couch their criticisms of judicial decisions in theoretical terms, which leads many judges―at the risk of intellectual stagnation―to dismiss most academic discourse as opaque and divorced from reality. In Divergent Paths, Richard Posner turns his attention to this widening gap within the legal profession, reflecting on its causes and consequences and asking what can be done to close or at least narrow it.

The shortcomings of academic legal analysis are real, but they cannot disguise the fact that the modern judiciary has several serious deficiencies that academic research and teaching could help to solve or alleviate. In U.S. federal courts, which is the focus of Posner’s analysis of the judicial path, judges confront ever more difficult cases, many involving complex and arcane scientific and technological distinctions, yet continue to be wedded to legal traditions sometimes centuries old. Posner asks how legal education can be made less theory-driven and more compatible with the present and future demands of judging and lawyering.

Law schools, he points out, have great potential to promote much-needed improvements in the judiciary, but doing so will require significant changes in curriculum, hiring policy, and methods of educating future judges. If law schools start to focus more on practical problems facing the American legal system rather than on debating its theoretical failures, the gulf separating the academy and the judiciary will narrow.

— Joe

It’s almost time to vote on the Executive Board’s unanimous recommendation that our association change its name to the Association for Legal Information (or “ally,” not “A”, “L”, “I”). But it is going to take more than mere rebranding (with its $185,000 price tag) to transform AALL into a vital organization for legal information consumers today and into the future. I wonder if we are up to the task of creating a new normal for providing leadership in the field of legal information and information policy.

Will we see a membership drive that reaches out to legal information professionals who work outside of the law library if the name change proposal is accepted by the rank-and-file? Of course, it is hard for many law librarians to justify paying AALL dues. Will non-law librarians working in the legal information field find the cost worth it to join under the big tent to be known as ALI? Non-traditional legal information professionals have been able to join AALL with full membership privileges for a couple of years now with no perceptible growth in membership rolls. While AALL doesn’t need money from new dues-paying members, our association does need to grow a non-traditional legal information membership base to change the negative connotations associated with “libraries” and “librarians.” If we change our name without also expanding our membership base, we will not be able to promote the value of all legal information professionals in any substantive way.

Will we see the rationale for this name change begin being realized with something other than the same old programming typical of most of our previous annual meetings? Hell if I know if AALL is prepared to “make it new.” I doubt an annual meeting programming initiative will happen without an influx of new, non-traditional members who, like the rest of us, are tasked with the professional mission of putting content in context. If we change our name without acquiring experts in the fields of knowledge management, competitive intelligence, legal analytics, search engine engineering and artificial intelligence as ALI members, we will have lost an opportunity to foster the development of the legal information profession.

Will we see a major revision of AALL’s bylaws? To give this rebranding effort teeth to take a bite out of negative, limiting, narrow perceptions about “libraries” and “librarians,” constitutional reform of AALL is needed. That reform, in my opinion, ought not to be put off. A case can be made that the Executive Board’s rebranding initiative should have been postponed until substantive bylaw reforms are made and voted on by the membership. If we change our name without restructuring our association, we will be in no better position to serve a leadership role than we were during the Great Recession; our association needs more than a name change to respond to the forces of change being thrust upon legal information professionals and their employers in the 21st century.

What we do see so far is that AALL has done a good communications job. There are plenty of resources available to members to read more about the proposed name change, including:

End Note: I have no illusions about membership drives, annual meeting programming and bylaw revisions but I will be voting in favor of the name change because of the opportunities it presents. I have not seen an argument opposed to the name change written in the blogosphere but an excellent post in favor can be found here. Voting opens Tuesday, January 12th, and results will be announced on February 11th. – Joe

From the announcement by Rick McKinney (Federal Reserve Board Law Library):

The Legislative Research Special Interest Section of the Law Librarians’ Society of Washington, D.C., Inc. (LLSDC) is pleased to announce a new addition to its Legislative Source Book entitled “Sources for the Congressional Record: Free and Commercial”. The new website contains a list with links to most all online sources for the Congressional Record, free and commercial, with dates of coverage, including the bound Record, the daily edition, the Congressional Record Index, and predecessors to the Congressional Record. Also included are brief notations about search, browse, print, and cite retrieval capabilities of the sources as well information on libraries with paper and microform issues. Finally there are a number of links to aid researchers in understanding the Congressional Record, its history, its volume numbers, and what is or is not included in the pages of the Record.

Visit LLSDC’s Legislative Source Book. — Joe

What does it mean to “think like a lawyer?”  For all the years I’ve worked in legal education (about 40) I admit I haven’t thought about the phrase much.  I have cups from Lexis with the phrase embossed on them.  But the phrase keeps coming home to me from time to time beyond promotional materials.  I encountered it when I had some unfortunate experience with my home plumbing during the Christmas break.  My kitchen sink backed up on Christmas morning.  That led to a series of events that started with drain cleaner and ended with cracked pipes and water leaking into my basement.  Ugh.

The clog was still intact on the Tuesday after Christmas when two plumbers arrived to remedy the situation. I had bailed the sink more than a few times between Christmas and then.  We put a little water in the sink and it started to pool in the drain.  One of the plumbers asked me what chemicals were in the water.  I said there shouldn’t be in there by now.  He replied that the boiling had to be caused by something.  There was almost imperceptible bubbling in the drain water.  I explained that early on in this adventure a friend of mine and I used drain cleaner at first.  I said almost automatically that I needed to “disclose” that to him.  We then had a short conversation about legal duty, though he wasn’t concerned about that.  I continued that law school does that to people.  I could not think of the condition of the sink without considering the legalities.  I told him at this point it was hard not to because of the perspective legal training creates.

I remember talking to a student last semester.  He had been working at a firm specializing in family relations, particularly those that are strained.  He was only half way through the curriculum and started to view the relationships in his family through a legal perspective.  I told him not to fight it.  That’s what law school does.  That’s thinking like a lawyer.  It’s not that his relatives would be potential clients as much as legal training puts that overlay on life.  It’s either sad or it means law school did what it was supposed to, or both.  I admit, sometimes I watch Tom and Jerry cartoons and count up the civil causes of action both have against each other.  Sad, I know.

Anyway, that’s it.  You know you think like a lawyer when legal rules play a part, not necessarily the only part, of everyday perspective.  In my plumber’s situation, it’s duty to warn or make safe.  Since I couldn’t make the chemicals in the water safe, I had to warn.  I don’t want a lawsuit after all.

 

Mark

From the Press Release:

Free online access to the official published judicial opinions of the Nebraska Supreme Court and Nebraska Court of Appeals will be available to the public beginning January 1, 2016.

Text-searchable opinions dating back to 1871 will be available for the Nebraska Supreme Court. The full collection of opinions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals, beginning with its establishment in 1992, will also be offered.

Previously, appellate court opinions were printed or were available online through various for-profit subscription services. All published opinions will be provided via the Nebraska Appellate Courts Online Library at ne.gov/go/opinions. Once printing of judicial opinions in the Nebraska Advance Sheets and the Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals ceases in June 2016, opinions will be available exclusively online.

Newly released opinions of both courts will continue to be available for 90 days on the Nebraska Judicial Branch Web site athttps://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/ and from the Clerk of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals upon request, and from any electronic provider of legal information choosing to provide them.

Official opinions in the online library will be accessible 24/7 using smart phones, tablets or computers from anywhere with Internet access. Access via the online library allows the appellate courts to make their judicial opinions more easily available to the public.

Nebraska joins Arkansas and Illinois in dropping printed opinions in favor of online access.  Hat Tip to Rich Leiter for the news.

Mark

The Supreme Court issued two opinions this morning.  The first is a habeas corpus case where the underlying issue is where a juror was struck for cause due to ambiguous statements made about applying the death penalty during the voir dire.  That case is White v. Wheeler (14-1372).  Wheeler was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death in Kentucky.  One juror, identified as Juror 638, responded to questions about his ability to impose the death as a sentencing option with answers that went back and forth.  The opinion describes these statements:

In response to the judge’s questions about his personal beliefs on the death penalty, Juror 638 said, “I’m not sure that I have formed an opinion one way or the other. I believe there are arguments on both sides of the—of it.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 126a. When asked by the prosecution about his ability to consider all available penalties, Juror 638 noted he had “never been confronted with that situation in a, in a real-life sense of having to make that kind of determination.” Id., at 131a. “So it’s difficult for me,” he explained, “to judge how I would I guess act, uh.” Ibid. The prosecution sought to clarify Juror 638’s answer, asking if the juror meant he was “not absolutely certain whether [he] could realistically consider” the death penalty. Id., at 132a. Juror 638 replied, “I think that would be the most accurate way I could answer your question.” Ibid. During defense counsel’s examination, Juror 638 described himself as “a bit more contemplative on the issue of taking a life and, uh, whether or not we have the right to take that life.” Id., at 133a. Later, however, he expressed his belief that he could consider all the penalty options. Id., at 134a.

The judge considered the prosecution’s motion to strike and, after reviewing the juror’s statements, granted the motion.  The Kentucky Supreme Court upheld Wheeler’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal.  Wheeler filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court.  The District Court dismissed but the Sixth Circuit reversed and granted the petition.

The Supreme Court reversed.  It emphasized the deferential approach to state courts required under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) unless the decision was contrary to federal law as decided by the Supreme Court.  The Court reviewed its precedents and concluded that under the deference requirement the Sixth Circuit erred in granting the petition.  The Court issued the opinion per curiam.  There were no dissents.

The second case involved the application of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) as controlling over state law.  Readers may remember that the Court enforced an arbitration clause in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333, awhile back.  That case came out of federal court where the Ninth Circuit enforced precedent (the Discover Bank case) that made waivers of class action suits unenforceable. The Court instead said the FAA preempted state law to the contrary and enforced the arbitration clause.

The present case, DIRECTV, INC. v.  Imburgia (14-462), concerns a variation of the Concepcion holding.  DIRECTV was sued in state court by individuals believing early termination fees violated California law.  The arbitration clause included in DIRECTV contracts limited dispute resolution to arbitration with a provision that waived class arbitration.  There was another provision stating that if “law of your state” makes the class arbitration waiver unenforceable then the entire arbitration clause was void.  The California trial court denied a request to send the matter to binding arbitration.  The California Court of Appeals agreed citing Discover Bank.

The Supreme Court essentially ruled that “law of your state” did not include state law that was invalid under federal law.  The Court cited multiple reasons for this conclusion, reasoning that in other circumstances courts would not rely on invalid state law in making decisions.   The “law” in this case includes the ruling in Concepcion which nullified the application of Discover Bank.  The Court made it pretty clear that there was no way of getting around the Concepcion ruling.  Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Alito, and Kagan.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.  Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Sotomayor.  Justice Thomas believes that the FAA does not apply to proceedings in state court.  Justice Ginsburg would read the entire contract as benefitting the consumer rather than corporate drafters.  He expresses similar views as to Justice Thomas but with a little more depth.

Mark

Prompted by Thomson Reuters Legal’s decision to make Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure more selective in describing and analyzing new case developments, Professor Joan Steinman, a co-author of the treatise, has been publishing digital compilations of case descriptions and citations to law review articles that complements the contents of the pocket parts to volumes 14B and C of the Wright & Miller treatise. “The cases described here either are not included at all in the 2015 volume 14B and C Pocket Parts or are cited there for different propositions than are reflected in this electronic publication.” Quoting from the abstract for Removal and Remand — Beyond the Supplements [SSRN, posted July 7, 2015]. See also Removal and Remand — Beyond the Supplements [SSRN, posted March 4, 2014].

This is the first time I’ve noticed something like this happening. Treatise authors confronted by similar WEXIS editorial decisions may want to follow Professor Steinman’s example. Unfortunately, the pocket parts at issue make no mention of Professor Steinman’s digital supplement. A statement could have been placed at the end of the following quotation from the pocket parts’ Preface:

As always, it is essential that the judge or lawyer using the Treatise check the supplementary material in connection with the question in which he or she is interested in order to be fully informed of the current state of the law.

— Joe

Ask most legal professionals where the Bluebook originated and they will likely say “Harvard Law School.” In The Secret History of the Bluebook (Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 100, No. 4, 2016 Forthcoming) [SSRN], Fred R. Shapiro (Yale) and Julie Graves Krishnaswami (Yale) beg to differ. They trace the origin of the Bluebook to Yale. As proof, the authors point to a 1920 one-page set of citation rules covering court opinions, law reviews, and treatises prepared for the use of the editorial board of the Yale Law Journal by William Murray Field under the direction of Karl Llewellyn, both YLS grads. In 1921, the Yale Law Journal expanded the Llewellyn-Field rules with the publication of “Abbreviations and Form of Citation”. Seven of the tiny 3-1/2″ x 5-1/2″ pages covered citation formats with seven additional pages being a table of abbreviations. (A second version of the “Abbreviations and Form of Citation” pamphlet containing only minor additions was printed in 1924.)

Following Yale’s lead in what we would call today, the uniform citation movement, Harvard Law School produced its own guide for the Harvard Law Review editioral staff in 1922, “Instructions for Editorial Work.” Many have pointed to the Harvard document as being the precusor to the first edition of the Bluebook which was published in 1926. The authors argue that the claim is unjustified because the Bluebook’s first edition only contains one sentence from HLS’ “Instructions for Editorial Work” while approximately 30 sentences from YLS’ “Abbreviations and Form of Citation” are found in the Bluebook’s first edition. Other similarities between Yale’s “Abbreviations and Form of Citation” and the Bluebook exist, e.g., the size and design and layout of the covers of the early editions of The Bluebook mimic Yale’s 1921 and 1924 pamphlet editions of “Abbreviations and Form of Citation.” There is much more historial detail in this highly recommended article that cannot be covered in this brief post. The article, for example, details workloads, copyright ownership and revenue sharing of the proceeds of the various editions of the Bluebook.

With the recent publication of the latest edition of The Bluebook, we can expect numerious articles by Bluebookologists for Bluebookologists about our current edition of the Bluebook as has happened when prior editions were first released. This time around, Shapiro and Krishnaswami set the record straight about where and how this work began. Highly recommended for Bluebookologists and anyone else interested in the adoption and use of standardized citation practices and advances in legal bibliography. — Joe

The Supreme Court issued one opinion this morning.  The case is Shapiro v. McManus (14-990).  Petitioners in this case challenged the constitutionality of Maryland’s congressional apportionment map under First Amendment/Freedom of Associations grounds.  They gave the District Judge a petition to convene a three-judge court to hear the matter.  28 U.S.C. §2284(a) states that when this type of lawsuit is filed and the judge is presented with a petition a three-judge court to hear the matter, the judge shall notify the chief judge of the Circuit who shall designate two other judges to serve on the panel.

The statute contains one qualification: “unless he determines that three judges are not required.”  The District Judge in this case decided that three judges were not required as he did not believe any relief was available to the petitioners in that they were free to join with others to express a political opinion.  Rather than notifying the Chief Judge, he dismissed the case.  The Fourth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion.

The Supreme Court reversed.  The Court stated that the statute is written in mandatory terms.  The only discretion the Judge has when presented with a petition for a three-judge panel is analyzing whether the parties properly belong in federal court, not whether the plaintiff’s case has any merit.  The petitioner’s claims clears the bar for jurisdiction.  The petitioner’s claims may or may not have merit, but they are entitled to a hearing before a three-judge court under the statute.  Justice Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Mark

Here’s a bit of news that archivists and historians may find useful on this anniversary of Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United States into World War II.  The Franklin Roosevelt Presidential Library has placed some 46,000 pages of speeches in draft, transcript, and final form online.  This collection is accompanied by another which comprises the complete audio recordings available of those speeches.  The site describes the collection:

The FDR Library, with support from AT&T, Marist College and the Roosevelt Institute launches online one of its most in-demand archival collections – FDR’s Master Speech File – over 46,000 pages of drafts, reading copies, and transcripts created throughout FDR’s political career. Presented alongside the Speech File is the Library’s complete digital collection of Recorded Speeches of FDR.

The earliest recording is dated 1920.  That’s pretty amazing given the state of recording technology in that era.  It’s more amazing that it can be downloaded in the ubiquitous MP3 format.  It’s that casual.

I’ve visited this site plenty of times in the past.  There is a wonderful collection of public domain photographs that document the Great Depression, the New Deal, and World War II.  There is some amazing stuff in these collections.  Speaking of Pearl Harbor, scroll halfway down this page for digitized research materials relating to Franklin Roosevelt and the Day of Infamy.

23-0132M

The original caption reads: “USS West Virginia and USS Tennessee after attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941.”  Archivist note:  USS West Virginia, BB-48, sinking after being hit with seven torpedoes and two armor-piercing bombs.  Along side is USS Tennesse, BB-43, after being hit with two bombs and being damaged by the explosion of the USS Arizona.  In the foreground are yard patrol craft which appear to be assisting in damage control and rescue operations.

Mark

The Supreme Court issued one opinion this morning.  The case is OBB Personenverkehr v. Sachs (13-1067).   The case involves a gruesome and unfortunate accident that befell Sachs as she attempted to board a train in Innsbruck, Austria. She fell on the tracks and before she could recover a moving train crushed her legs necessitating the amputation of both above the knee.  The train was operated by OBB which the parties agree is an instrumentality of Austria.  Sachs sued OBB in the Northern District of California for her injuries and alleged that jurisdiction was proper under the commercial activities exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.  One month before her accident she purchased a Eurail pass via the Internet from The Rail Pass Experts, a Massachusetts-based travel agent.  This was the only activity related to OBB that took place in the United States.

Sachs made five claims:

Sachs sued OBB in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, asserting five causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) strict liability for design defects in the train and platform; (3) strict liability for failure to warn of those design defects; (4) breach of an implied warranty of merchantability for providing a train and platform unsafe for their intended uses; and (5) breach of an implied warranty of fitness for providing a train and platform unfit for their intended uses.

The District Court dismissed the case stating that her claims did not fall within the commercial exception located at 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2).  A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  A rehearing en banc reversed the divided panel and said the sale of the ticket fell within the exception.  The Supreme Court reversed concluding that the sale of the ticket in the United States was too remote from the elements of Sachs’ claims to fall within the exception.

The Court’s analysis turned on whether the commercial activity was directly related to injuries she claimed in her complaint.  The Court said there was nothing wrongful about the sale of the ticket that could be the basis of a suit that survives the FSIA.  Otherwise, the Court stated, many more suits could be filed against sovereigns using creative pleading.  The Court rejected other arguments as well as they were raised for the first time in the Supreme Court hearing.  Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Mark

Yes, it’s been a while.  Between the ever present health issues and building and teaching a set of lesson plans on legal research to our first year students, it’s been tough to get back to the blog.  Well, the teaching part is essentially over until the first week of classes in January.  Let me catch up with a few things, a couple of business and one essentially fun.

The first business item is the announcement I received recently noting that Lexis has purchased Lex Machina:

Today LexisNexis announced that it has acquired Silicon Valley-based Lex Machina, creators of the award-winning Legal Analytics platform that helps law firms and companies excel in the business and practice of law.

A look into the near future. The integration of Lex Machina Legal Analytics with the deep collection of LexisNexis content and technology will unleash the creation of new, innovative solutions to help predict the results of legal strategies for all areas of the law.

With its acquisition, Lex Machina becomes part of the ongoing LexisNexis commitment to offer modern, next-generation solutions that help legal professionals work more efficiently, make better-informed decisions and drive success for their clients, practice and business.

The acquisition is described as a “prominent and fresh example of how a major player in legal technology and publishing is investing in analytics capabilities.”  I can understand that.  As we grew up with Lexis and Westlaw we were taught (or taught) the utility of field searching.  The available information in a document allowed us to search particular judges or attorneys to do our own analysis of their involvement with topics and issues.  We have the ability today to make more detailed analyses.

Expert witness reports are where Lexis and Westlaw mostly provide background information and the track record of particular witnesses.  Both companies offer comprehensive details because there is quite a market for experts in litigation.  Lex Machina is identified with analytics associated with copyright and a few other forms of intellectual property.  I can imagine Lexis and Westlaw expanding analytics for other litigation prone subjects such as medical malpractice and products liability.  I can see this as a new area of competition between the major research databases.

The second business item is a one day conference at Ohio State University:

OSU reference librarian Ingrid Mattson is co-chairing a great one-day conference for the Legal Writing Institute.  I’m sharing the announcement just in case you’d like to attend.  There are several presentations by ORALL members.

Join us in Columbus, Ohio, on December 11 for our one-day workshop, “Collaboration In and Out of the Legal Writing Classroom.” Topics include collaborating with legal writing colleagues for successful scholarship; students working together in the classroom; librarians and legal writing faculty joining forces for more effective research instruction; and connecting with casebook and clinical faculty, the community outside the law school, and university offices to provide meaningful, resource-conscious instruction.

Our workshop website, which includes program details and hotel information, can be found here. Workshop registration can be found here.

Columbus offers a number of unique experiences year round and particularly during the holiday season. Consider staying through the weekend to enjoy a dessertcoffee, or beer tour of a city with a dynamic food scene. Those who are more literary-minded will enjoy a Dickens of a Christmas and a Dickens Dinner at the historical Ohio Village. If you have an interest in politics, history, or architecture, touring the Ohio Statehouse is fun and free. A short walk from the workshop site you can explore the Billy Ireland Cartoon Library and Museum. Finally, for anyone visiting with children or who fondly remembers Jack Hannah and the Columbus Zoo on David Letterman, check out the zoo’s extraordinary holiday light tradition, Wildlights. For more information on the exciting goings-on in Columbus, visit Experience Columbus.

Columbus truly is the heart of it all. We are driving distance from places like Indianapolis, Pittsburgh, Lexington, Chicago, Charleston; and a non-stop flight away from pretty much everywhere else.
We hope to see you in December! For more information about the conference, please feel free to contact us at Kelly.864@osu.edu or Mattson.30@osu.edu.

The conference cost is a very reasonable $45 aside from any lodgings.  I’m not expecting to sample the charms of Columbus while I’m there.  I was interested in going to a Blue Jackets game but it turned out the team is on the road in Winnipeg on December 10th.  The Islanders come in to Nationwide Arena on the 12th but unfortunately I can’t stay over.

And now the fun part.  As part of the Halloween picture extravaganza, I shared costumes and decorations from a number of libraries.  One of those picture sets from Wayne State included periodicals turned into bat decorations.  Well, it seems the bats have turned into turkeys for the coming holiday.  See the pictures below.

Thanksgiving 2 Thanksgiving 3 Thanksgiving 1

Well, I hope to publish more frequently now that my major semester project is effectively over.

Mark

The University of California System issued a directive near the end of October that require faculty to place their scholarly works in open access sources:

Each Faculty member grants to the University of California a nonexclusive, irrevocable, worldwide license to exercise any and all rights under copyright relating to each of his or her scholarly articles, in any medium, and to authorize others to do the same, for the purpose of making their articles widely and freely available in an open access repository. Any other systematic uses of the licensed articles by the University of California must be approved by the Academic Senate. This policy does not transfer copyright ownership, which remains with Faculty authors under existing University of California policy.

* * *

To assist the University in disseminating and archiving the articles, Faculty commit to helping the University obtain copies of the articles. Specifically, each Faculty member who does not permanently waive the license above will provide an electronic copy of his or her final version of the article to the University of California by the date of its publication, for inclusion in an open access repository. When appropriate, a Faculty member may instead notify the University of California if the article will be freely available in another repository or as an open-access publication. Faculty members who have permanently waived the license may nonetheless deposit a copy with the University of California or elsewhere for archival purposes.

Notwithstanding the above, this policy does not in any way prescribe or limit the venue of publication. This policy neither requires nor prohibits the payment of fees or publication costs by authors.

That last line is interesting.  There are two articles at the Chronicle of Higher Education worth reading that relate to the issue of fees.  One is What Open-Access Publishing Actually Costs by Ellen Wexler, and the other is What a Mass Exodus at a Linguistics Journal Means for Scholarly Publishing, also by Wexler.  Both are pretty good examinations of issues surrounding the hidden costs of open-access publishing.  The first article (later in date) points out that placement of scholarly articles even for open access can require a publication fee.  Comments there point out that someone is paying for the time to peer review (usually the university or college employing the reviewer through salary), or providing the server space, or other elements that go between the publication and its editorial and distribution network.

The other article tells of the mass resignation of the editorial staff for the journal Linqua, published by Elsevier.  The staff had asked that the journal become open-access and given to them to pursue that goal.  Elsevier unsurprisingly said no.  The company has said that it continue publishing the title under a new team.  The article states that authors currently must pay some $1,800 per article to make it free to readers among other costs.

This isn’t necessarily the model for law reviews.  They are edited by students and usually not peer-reviewed.  The trend is to make content available for free via the law journal’s web site.  Even still, the University or Law School has underlying costs to make this happen by paying for the underlying technical equipment and/or subsidizing the loss of subscriptions.  The takeaway from Wexler’s articles is that free really isn’t really free.  Costs shift to someone else.  Whether that model is sustainable remains to be seen.

Mark

The Supreme Court issued one opinion today.  The case, Mullenix v. Luna (14-1143), decided whether a Texas state trooper (Mullenix) was entitled to qualified immunity when he fired shots at a suspect’s car during a high speed chase, killing the suspect.  The Court’s restatement of the facts show that Israel Leija, Jr. resisted an attempt to arrest him and fled in his car.  Another officer, Sergeant Randy Baker, pursued Leija in a chase reaching speeds between 85 and 110 miles per hour.  Other officers joined the pursuit.  Leija called local police dispatchers twice and informed them that he was armed and would shoot officers if the chase was not called off.  This information was relayed to the pursuing officers along with information that Leija may be intoxicated.

Some officers set up road spikes at a location Leija was expected to pass.  Mullenix intended to set up spikes as well but decided he might disable the car by shooting at it.  He radioed his decision to his supervisor, Sergeant Byrd, who said to stand by and see if the spikes worked first.  Mullenix was joined by  Officer Shipman and they discussed Mullenix’ plan to shoot at the car.  Leija approached and Mullenix fired six shots.  Leija’s car hit the spikes and rolled over two and a half times.  Four of six shots Mullenix fired hit Leija in the upper body and killed him.  There was no evidence that any of the bullets hit any portion of the car that could have disabled it.

Leija’s family sued Mullenix on civil rights violations, specifically that Leija’s Fourth Amendment rights had been violated.  Mullenix filed a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.  The district court denied the motion and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial.  The Fifth Circuit withdrew its first opinion but substantially upheld the denial in a second opinion.

The Supreme Court reversed.  It stated the standard for applying qualified immunity is whether the conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”  The Court explained that lower courts should not apply the standard in a general sense and that the application is fact dependent.  The Court noted there were only two prior cases where it ruled on excessive/deadly force involving car chases.  In those two:

The Court has thus never found the use of deadly force in connection with a dangerous car chase to violate the Fourth Amendment, let alone to be a basis for denying qualified immunity.

Further, lower court cases decided subsequently have not established that the use of force in situations similar to the present case is inappropriate.  The mere fact that other courts have found the level of force appropriate in more extreme cases does not render the use inappropriate here.

The Court issued the case as a per curiam opinion.  Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment.  Justice Sotomayor dissented.

Mark