The Supreme Court issued one opinion this morning.  That case is Kansas v. Cheever (12-609).  It concerns whether the prosecution’s use of court-ordered testimony by an expert to rebut expert testimony by the defense’s expert in a criminal case violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights.  The Court held that it does not.

Cheever and his friends were high on meth when he was warned that officers were on their way to arrest him.  He tried to escape but his car had a flat tire.  He ultimately hid in a bedroom with a .44 revolver.  He heard steps and stepped out of the bedroom and shot and killed Officer Matthew Samuels.  He shot at others as well, though only Officer Samuels was hit.

Cheever was charged with capital murder.  The Kansas Supreme Court held in an unrelated case that the Kansas death penalty scheme was unconstitutional.  Prosecutors dismissed the charges and let federal prosecutors charge Cheever under the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994.  Cheever indicated that he would defend by introducing expert evidence relating to his ability to form specific intent due to meth intoxication.  The federal court ordered Cheever to submit to a psychiatric exam to assess how the meth how affected him when he shot Samuels.  Michael Welner interviewed Cheever for five hours.

Cheever’s counsel became unable to continue in the early stages of the jury selection.  The federal judge suspended the proceedings and later dismissed them without prejudice.  In the meantime, the Supreme Court reviewed the Kansas death penalty scheme and found it constitutional.  Kansas prosecutors then brought a second prosecution against Cheever.  He presented a voluntary-intoxication defense and argued that his meth use rendered him incapable of premeditation.  He offered supportive testimony from Roswell Lee Evans, a specialist in psychiatric pharmacy and dean of the Auburn University School of Pharmacy.

The State sought to introduce testimony from Michael Welner as rebuttal to Evans’ testimony.  Cheever objected as he had not voluntarily agreed to the interview with Welner.  The judge allowed the testimony in part because Evans relied on Welner’s report.  The jury convicted Cheever at the end of the trial and imposed a death sentence.

The Kansas Supreme Court vacated Cheever’s conviction and sentence.  It held that Cheever’s Fifth Amendment rights had been violated by introducing Welner’s rebuttal testimony.  The Kansas Supreme Court distinguished Supreme Court precedent, Buchanan v. Kentucky, to the contrary.  Buchanan allowed limited introduction of court-ordered examination for the limited purpose of rebutting a mental-status defense.  The Kansas Supreme Court distinguished Buchanan on the grounds that voluntary intoxication was not a “mental disease or defect” under Kansas law.

The Supreme Court reversed.  It reaffirmed Buchanan saying that when a defendant raises the issue of mental state with expert testimony, he cannot block the State’s rebuttal.  It disagreed with the Kansas Supreme Court’s characterization of voluntary intoxication not being a mental disease or defect.  The Court stated that its precedents are not that narrow.  It uses the term “mental-status defense” which includes the use of expert testimony as to a defendant’s mens rea, the capacity to commit the offense or the ability to premeditate.  Once the issue is raised through expert testimony, it can be countered with additional expert testimony.

Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Mark

That’s the title of a recent Fastcase Blog post by Joshua Auriemma. Here’s his open salvo:

I often wonder whether the Googleification of legal research isn’t a terrible thing for the profession (at least in this stage of the technology’s development). In law school, I was a master of Boolean searching. I thought about my research question, figured out which words probably appeared closest to other words, and crafted a narrow and specific search.

Somehow, when I became an appellate attorney and had access to WestlawNext through my firm, all of that training went out the window.

If interested, continue reading the post here. — Joe

From the announcement:

Do you have a great lesson plan or assignment that you’d be willing to share?  How about handouts or PowerPoint slides?  If so, then we need your help!

The RIPS Teach-In Kit Committee is currently accepting submissions for the 2014 Teach-In Kit.  The Teach-In Kit is a resource where law librarians can share materials and ideas to help improve legal research instruction.  We hope you’ll consider helping out your colleagues by submitting your materials to this year’s Kit.  We invite you to send contributions as email attachments to Shawn Nevers at neverss@law.byu.edu.

Prior contributions have included course syllabi, lesson plans, research guides, assignments, lecture notes, handouts, examinations, quizzes, PowerPoint slides, tutorials and games.  Examples of past submissions can be found in kits from previous years.

The deadline for contributions is Friday, January 24, 2014. Thanks in advance for your contributions!

— Joe

The Supreme Court issued one opinion this morning and dismissed a second case as improvidently granted.  The case that was dismissed is Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall (12-99).  That case concerned an agreement between a union and an employer over organizing and other considerations.  The details are in the dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer, and joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.

The second case is Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs (12-815).  The issue in the case is whether a federal court should abstain from deciding a regulatory dispute between a state regulatory board and a communications carrier when there are parallel proceedings in state and federal court.  Sprint withheld payments for Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) calls to a local Iowa carrier, Windstream Iowa Communications,  after concluding that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempted intrastate regulation of VoIP traffic.  Windstream threatened to block Sprint customer calls.  Sprint responded by asking the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB) to enjoin Windstream from blocking calls.  Windtsream backed down and Sprint withdrew its filing.  The IUB continued the action as the issue could come up again.  It held against Sprint, deciding that fees applied.

Sprint filed parallel actions against the IUB in state and federal court.  The federal court invoked the abstention doctrine developed in Younger v. Harris and subsequent cases.  The court found that Iowa had an interest in regulating and enforcing state utility rates.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed.  The Supreme Court reversed.  It concluded that the three types of cases to which Younger applied was not appropriate in this situation.

The exceptions included state criminal proceedings, certain state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal proceedings, and civil proceedings involving orders that are uniquely in furtherance of a state courts’ ability to perform its judicial function.  Rejecting arguments to the contrary, the Court said the facts of this case do not apply to any of the exceptions.  The Court characterized the dispute as ultimately between two private parties who had invoked the state to settle a dispute between them.  The Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of case law would have the potential to extend the Younger doctrine to virtually all parallel civil proceedings.  Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Mark

If approved by the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, ABAJ’s Mark Hansen reports that the Protocol for Reviewing Law Graduate Employment Data, and Statement of Procedures for Collecting, Maintaining and Reporting Law Graduate Employment Data—DRAFT (dated Nov. 8, 2013) could take effect with the class of 2014, whose employment data must be reported to the ABA by April 7, 2015. In addition to random audits of law school employment data, “[the ABA] section would also conduct annual ‘red flag’ reviews of all schools then under sanction for misreporting employment information, as well as all schools it ‘has reason to believe’ are reporting false or inaccurate information.”

According to the draft proposal approved by the governing council of the ABA section, “while this Protocol and Statement are designed to uncover inaccurate, incomplete or misleading reporting where it exists, a principal goal is to mandate that schools maintain supporting documentation that will substantiate their reported data.” However, Hansen reports

Council member Edward Tucker, a Cleveland CPA, said he thinks the effort is “doomed” because graduates have no obligation to disclose their employment status to the schools they graduated from.

“What we’ve done is construct a dike to hold back the ocean with a great big hole in the middle,” he said of the proposal.

— Joe

With admissions plummeting since the end of the recession, S&P observes that credit quality of stand-alone law schools and law schools associated with smaller regional and non-flagship public universities has been deteriorating. Only component law school credit ratings for national and large public universities remain high. “[T]he strong [are] becoming stronger or remaining stable while the weak are becoming weaker.” For details, see S&P’s As Law School Demand Drops, Credit Quality Among U.S. Schools Diverges (Dec. 5, 2013). See also Brian Leiter’s Law School Reports post. — Joe

Quoting from the December 5, 2013 press release republished in full on No Shelf Required:

Through OverDrive, K-12 school libraries and public libraries will be able to offer 24/7 access to McGraw-Hill Professional digital titles in four broad categories: Business/Consumer, Science/Technical, Test Prep/Education, and Medical.

The eBook collection for schools and public libraries includes more than 700 recently released titles for researchers, business, medical, and technical professionals, and students preparing for ACT, SAT, MCAT or LSAT exams. These titles and more are available now for libraries and schools to lend for virtually any device with a modern browser… .

I think this would not have happened, at least not this soon, if not for ALA robust consumer advocacy campaign. Isn’t it time for AALL to get its act together? — Joe

If anyone thinks that the paper industry is dying a slow death because of electronic information replacing printed information, well, this article in the Los Angeles Times should dispel that notion.  One statistic cited is the $27.8 billion in 2012 sales by International Paper.  That was an increase of $1.8 billion over the previous 12 months.  Paper is still essential for everyday conveniences.

I suppose that we get horrified when the NSA tracks us, but it’s cool when Apple does it, right?  See this story in ABC News.

Old school publishing and open access tussle in this story of the conflict between Elsevier and Academia.edu over posting academic papers.  Thanks to DMCA takedown notices, guess who is winning for now?  The story is in CNET.

The Chronicle of Higher Education is telling us that the average debt at graduation for undergrads is $29,400.  If that’s the average, then Mamas don’t let your babies grow up to be law students.  That’s where tens of thousands of more get piled on.  Someone should sell bumper stickers that read “law school is for trust funders.”  Some 18.5% of Ph.D graduates have $30,001 or more of debt according to another story in the Chronicle.  It was 16% in 2002.

One law school is actually responding to the debt crisis by (gasp!) lowering its tuition.  The University of Iowa is lowering its tuition by 16.4% for both in- and out-of-state students.  That’s a drop of $4,300 and nearly $8,000 less per year respectively for these students.  The drop kicks in starting with the fall 2004 semester.  How can they do it? Volume, volume, volume.  The school can make up the financial difference with just about 20 or so additional students.  Read about it in the Huffington Post.

Joe wrote about the Arizona State University announcement for its new law school home in downtown Phoenix.  There is a picture of the planned Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at the KTAR web site.   It looks pretty impressive. I wonder how it’s going to be financed.

Mark

Don’t know but ASU Law’s plans might point the way toward a new beginning in the public sector of the legal academy if this ambitious project is successful because —

  • The new law school complex will be located in downtown Phoenix (instead of Tempe);
  • It will include a public law library and a civic outreach center; and
  • It will be the home for a non-profit law firm called the ASU Alumni Law Group which will be staffed with up to 30 recent ASU Law grads under the supervision of five experienced attorneys.

If the Arizona Board of Regents approves the plan, construction could begin as early as summer 2014 and the center may be open in fall 2016. For details, including links to press coverage, see this press release. — Joe

On Dewey B Strategic, Jean O’Grady identifies what’s hot and what’s not based on the findings of this year’s AmLaw 200 Law Firm Leadership Survey. My personal favorite is “Succession planning:  Hot (making a succession plan) Not ( executing a succession plan).” Jean reports that “[a]lthough the majority of firms have a succession plan – 90% of firm leaders have been in place for more than 10 years, so succession is not happening.” For more, see AmLaw 200 Law Firm Leaders Survey: What’s Hot and What’s Not. — Joe

It’s free and it will be streamed live today starting at 2:00 pm Eastern. Panel members include Gwen Evans, Executive Director of OhioLINK, Courtney Greene, Head, Discovery & Research Services, Indiana University and Edward Smith, Executive Director, Abilene Library Consortium. Pre-registration for this 60-minute discussion is not required. Details here. — Joe

From yesterday’s ABA press release:

The committee found that Rutgers-Camden violated Standard 503, which requires law schools to use a valid and reliable admissions test, and Interpretation 503-1, which requires law schools that use an admissions test other than the Law School Admission Test to establish the test’s validity and reliability in determining an applicant’s ability to complete the J.D. program.

Rutgers-Camden operated an admissions program, without obtaining a variance from the ABA, that allowed some applicants to use a standardized graduate admissions test score instead of an LSAT score to gain admission to the law school. The school subsequently qualified for a variance but elected to suspend the program.

The accreditation committee imposed a public censure on the law school, which must post the censure document prominently on its website home page for one year. The censure is also posted on the website of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar.

The committee also imposed a $25,000 monetary penalty based on the benefit the school received from operating the program.

Hat tip to Mark Hansen’s ABAJ post. — Joe

 

The Supreme Court’s other opinion from yesterday concerns taxation in the context of partnerships designed to generate large tax losses that offset a partner’s income.  The case is United States v. Woods (12-562).  Gary Woods and his employer, Billy Joe McCombs, bought offsetting currency options from Deutsche Bank.  They paid a premium for the long option and sold back a short option to the Bank which substantially reduced the cost of the long option alone.  Woods and McCombs contributed the spreads to two partnerships along with some $3.2 million in cash that was used to purchase stock and currency.  They ultimately disposed of their interests and claimed losses of $45 million.  They attributed this to calculations that accounted for the long option and ignored the offsetting short option.

The IRS treated the partnerships as shams designed for tax avoidance.  As such, the IRS viewed them as not valid for tax purposes.  The Service sent each partnership a Notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment and assessed a 40% penalty on the tax underpayment.  Woods filed suit in federal District Court which held that the partnerships were properly disregarded as shams.  The Court also held that the penalty did not apply.  This was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.

The Supreme Court reversed.  The Court agreed that the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) applied, allowing the IRS to initiate partnership-related tax proceedings at the partnership level.  The Court noted that there were multiple forums and procedures followed, some of which gave inconsistent results, before TEFRA.  The District Court had the power under the Act to determine whether the partnership was a sham (an adjustment under the Act) and whether a penalty relating to the adjustment applied.  The language of TERFA makes it clear that the penalty assessed by the IRS applied in this case.  In that respect, the holdings of the lower courts were reversed.  Justice Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Mark

Congratulations and good luck to this year’s crop of elected officers.

Vice President/President-Elect (July 2014 – July 2015)

  • Keith Ann Stiverson, Director of the Law Library and Senior Lecturer, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law

Secretary (July 2014 – July 2017)

  • Katherine K. Coolidge, Law Librarian, Bulkley, Richardson and Gelinas, LLP

Executive Board (July 2014 – July 2017)

  • John W. Adkins, Director of Libraries, San Diego Law Library
  • Donna Nixon, Electronic Resources Librarian & Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

This year’s election generated about as much rank-and-file interest as previous years. AALL reported that only 29.96% of dues paying members voted. — Joe

The Supreme Court issued two opinions this morning.  The first of these is Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. United States Dist. Court for Western Dist. of Texas (12-929).  The case concerns the effect of a forum-selection clause in a situation where one of the parties sues in a federal court other than that specified in the contract.  Atlantic Marine, a Virginia company, entered into a contract with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to construct a child-development center at Fort Hood.  The base is in the Western District of Texas.  Atlantic Marine subcontracted with J-Crew Management Inc., a Texas Company, to do some of the work.  The subcontract called for all disputes to be litigated in “Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, or the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division.”

There was a dispute over payments and J-Crew sued in the Western District of Texas rather than a Virginia Court.  Atlantic Marine moved to dismiss the suit under venue statutes and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Atlantic Marine alternatively moved under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia.  That motion was denied as well.  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a petition for mandamus ordering the transfer.  The Court of Appeals said the District Court did not abuse its discretion when analyzing the balance of interests required under §1404(a).

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals.  It determined that venue was proper in any federal court so long as it had personal jurisdiction over the parties under the venue statutes.  This related back to the original motions for dismissal which invoked the concept of the case being filed in the wrong venue.  The Court agreed that the correct procedure was a motion to transfer under §1404(a) and invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  In this case, however, the District Court improperly placed the burden on Atlantic Marine to prove that the transfer was appropriate.  The burden should have been on J-Crew to defend against the violation of the contractually bargained-for choice of forum.

The Court stated three factors for federal courts to use in determining whether the motion to transfer should be granted:

  1. The plaintiff’s choice of forum should merit no weight as the party defying the choice of forum selection.  Plaintiffs can typically select a court for their advantage.  As a party that agreed to the forum clause in a contract, it had already exercised its choice of venue.  Hence the burden is on the plaintiff to show why the clause should not be enforced.
  2. The District Court should not consider the parties’ private interests, such as whether it would or would not be convenient for witnesses to appear in another location.  When parties agree to a forum they have waived the right to challenge the selection of the forum.
  3. When a party flouts its contractual obligation, a §1404(a) transfer of venue will not carry the original venue’s choice of law rules.  This may affect the public interest considerations of the analysis.  The effect, however, prevents the plaintiff from gaining the benefit of the choice of law of the state where the suit was originally filed.

The Court did not decide the outcome of the motion to transfer based on its analysis.  Rather, it sent the case back to the lower courts to make that determination.  Justice Alito announced the opinion for a unanimous court.

I’ll report on the second case tomorrow.  It concerns taxation of partnerships set up as a tax avoidance vehicle.

Mark

By now most people has heard about Amazon’s plans to delivery 5-pound or less packages to a customer’s doorstep within a half hour of placing an order by way of unmanned drones. (If not, here’s the link to Charlie Rose’s 60 Minutes story). But what does the FAA has to say about it? According to Jacob Gersham’s WSJ Law Blog post, the FAA issued a policy notice back in 2007 but has never issued a formal regulation banning the commercial use of drones. Details at What the Law Says About Amazon’s ‘Prime Air’ Drones.

After getting over the wow factor, the first thought that popped into my head after viewing the 60 Minutes segment was, “oh boy, its going to be year-round hunting season if/when Amazon implements this, hopefully with paintball guns, not shotguns”. — Joe

The Supreme Court issued a single Per Curiam opinion this morning.  It deals with federal jurisdiction in the context of tax payments, refunds, and when interest starts to accrue, though the opinion does not resolve the tax issues.  The case is Ford Motor Company v. United States (13-113).

The IRS informed Ford that it had underpaid its taxes for the years 1983 through 1989.  Ford gave the Government several payments totaling $875 million that stopped the accrual of interest that Ford would otherwise owe pending the result of the audits.  Ford told the Government to treat the deposits as advance payments that Ford would otherwise owe.  As it turns out, Ford had overpaid its taxes which entitled the company to a return of the overpayment with interest from the date of overpayment under 26 U.S.C. §6611.  The Code section, however, does not define the date of overpayment.  The Government claimed the starting date of the accrual began with the date Ford asked that the overpayments be used as credits.  Ford claimed, however, that the date of accrual should be when the deposits were made.  The difference in interpretations was about $445 million.

Ford sued the Government in Federal District Court using 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(1) as the basis for jurisdiction.  That section authorizes civil actions against the United States to recovery taxes erroneously or illegally assessed or collected.  The Government and the District Court did not contest the jurisdictional authority.  The District Court held for the Government’s interpretation and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Ford sought certiorari on the issue.  The Government countered for the first time on appeal that 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(1) does not apply to the suit.  It contended that the Tucker Act applies to the suit meaning that the only court with jurisdiction over the case is the United States Court of Federal Claims.  The Supreme Court sent the case back to the Sixth Circuit to determine which statute waives sovereign immunity and to determine which court has proper jurisdiction.  Bloomberg has a short report on the case.

Mark

In his recent Download of the Week post, Solum wrote “this is important research, combined with deeply interesting theorizing.” He was referring to Statutory Interpretation from the Inside – An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part II, Stanford Law Review, forthcoming, by Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman. Part I was published earlier this year. Here are the abstracts for both.

Statutory Interpretation from the Inside — An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I [SSRN], 65 Stanford Law Review 901 (2013):

What role should the realities of the legislative drafting process play in the theories and doctrines of statutory interpretation and administrative law? The ongoing debates frequently turn on empirical assumptions about how Congress drafts and what interpretive rules Congress knows, but there has been almost no testing of whether any of these assumptions reflect legislative reality. We have attempted to fill that void. This is the first of two Articles reporting the results of the most extensive empirical study to date — a survey of 137 congressional counsels drawn from both parties, both chambers of Congress and spanning multiple committees — on topics ranging from drafters’ knowledge and use of the textual and substantive canons of interpretation, to legislative history, the administrative law deference doctrines, the legislative process and the Court-Congress relationship.

Our findings have implications for virtually every swath of the interpretive debates. We can report, for instance, that there are some canons that our drafters know and use — Chevron and the presumption against preemption, for example, but that there are other canons that our drafters know, but consciously reject in favor of political or other considerations, including the presumption in favor of consistent usage, the rule against superfluities, and dictionary use; and still other canons, like Mead and noscitur a sociis, that our drafters do not know as legal rules but that seem to be accurate judicial reflections of how Congress drafts. Our interviews also elicited a treasure trove of information about key influences on the drafting process that legal doctrine rarely considers, from the variety of audiences for legislative history, to the way in which the personal reputation of particular agency heads affects delegation decisions, to the fact that drafting conventions depend on the type of statute being drafted and its path through Congress.

All of these findings, and many others, allow us to press for a more precise answer to one of the fields’ foundational questions: that is, what should be the purpose of these canons of interpretation? Judges, often using the unhelpful generalization that they are Congress’s “faithful agents,” have legitimized these doctrines using a variety of conflicting justifications, some of which turn on empirical reality, some of which do not, and most of which aim to justify many different types of canons that seem to be doing very different types of work. Do the canons reflect how Congress actually drafts, and so effectuate legislative supremacy? Or do judges use the canons for more dialogical reasons, such as to encourage Congress to draft more precisely — and does Congress listen? Might the canons, despite how “neutral” some appear, instead be understood to effectuate judicial values that are external to the legislative process — such as advancing constitutional norms or imposing coherence on the U.S. Code? Our study illuminates this variety across the normative bases for the canons also reveals that each set of justifications rests on a very different vision of the judicial power and the Court-Congress relationship.

Statutory Interpretation from the Inside – An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part II [SSRN]:

This is the second of two Articles relaying the results of the most extensive survey to date of 137 congressional drafters about the doctrines of statutory interpretation and administrative delegation. The first Article focused on our respondents’ knowledge and use of the interpretive principles that courts apply. This second Article moves away from the judicial perspective. Our findings here highlight the overlooked legislative underbelly: the personnel, structural and process-related factors that, our respondents repeatedly volunteered, drive the details of the drafting process more than do judicial rules of interpretation. These factors range from the fragmentation caused by the committee system; to the centrality of nonpartisan professional staff in the drafting of statutory text; to the use of increasingly unorthodox legislative procedures – each of which, our respondents told us, affects statutory consistency and use of legislative history in different and important ways. Our respondents also painted a picture of legislative staffers in a primary interpretive conversation with agencies, not with courts, and as using different kinds of signals for their communications with agencies than courts consider.

Most of the structural, personnel and process-related influences that our respondents emphasized have not been recognized by courts or scholars, but understanding them calls into question almost every presumption of statutory interpretation in current deployment. These findings have significance for textualism, purposivism and beyond. They undermine the claims of proponents of each theory that theirs is the most democracy-enhancing, because none makes satisfactory efforts to really reflect congressional expectations. Our findings challenge textualism’s operating assumption that text is the best evidence of the legislative bargain and suggest more relevant – but still-formalist – structural features that might do better. They reveal that although purposivists or eclectic theorists may have the right idea with a more contextual approach, many of factors on which they focus are not the same ones that Congress utilizes. With respect to delegation, for both types of theorists, Chevron now seems too text- and court-centric, in the light of our findings, to actually capture congressional intent to delegate, which has been its asserted purpose.

In the end, our findings raise the question whether the kind of “faithful agent” approach to interpretation that most judges currently employ – one aimed effectuating legislative deals and often focused on granular textual details – can ever be successful. We thus look to different paradigms less dependent on how Congress works, including rule-of-law and pragmatic approaches to interpretation. These alternatives respond to the problem of the sausage factory, but pose different challenges in light of the modern judicial sensibility’s pronounced concern with legislative supremacy.

See also the authors’ Methods Appendix for their two-part series. — Joe

Try as research instructors do, one can’t get around the fact that researchers are going to turn to Google Search. One might as well be realistic by providing detailed instruction on how to get the most out of Google Search. Christa Burns and Michael P. Sauers’ new work could be handy for this task. From the ALA Bookstore blurb:

Google Search Secrets
Christa Burns and Michael P. Sauers
Item Number: 978-1-55570-923-5
Publisher: ALA Neal-Schuman
Price: $48.00

Google can be an incredibly powerful tool for research, but the top-of-the-page results are seldom the most beneficial to library users and students, and many of the search engine’s most useful features are hidden behind its famously simple interface. Burns and Sauers reveal the secrets of effective Google searches in this invaluable resource showing how to get the most out of the service, with

  • An overview of all the tool’s search services, including Image, Maps, News, Blogs, Discussions, Scholar, Patents, and Books
  • Ready-to-use instructions on how to go beyond the simple search box and top results to get library users the answers they need, fast
  • Straightforward guidance on using filters to refine search results, with examples of common searches like images with Creative Commons licenses, news searches set for a date range or into an archive, and videos with closed captioning
  • An explanation of the bibliography manager feature of Google Scholar, which allows students and researchers to build bibliographies with ease
  • Tips for configuring Safe Search on workstations in children’s departments and schools
  • Copious screenshots walk readers through each topic step by step, making this a true how-to guide for everyone who uses Google.

— Joe